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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Until the last few decades, conflicts between nation-states were confined 
to four domains: land, water, air, and space.1 Common to each of these do-
mains is the fact that they are all physical divisions with relatively distinct 
borders. It was not until recently when we added the fifth domain, cyberspace, 
that laws had to be adapted to deal with an entire realm of activity that only 
exists intangibly.2 Cyberattacks are unique in that the individuals actually per-
petrating the assaults do not need to be present within the physical arena they 
are targeting, and they do not require the extensive training or heavy artillery 
required for the success of most military operations.3 The Ponemon Institute 
reported in 2016 that American companies lost on average $17.36 million per 
year to cyberattacks, but the thieves only needed a few computers to carry out 
their attacks.4 
In May 2017, North Korea was linked to the WannaCry cyberattacks that 
targeted personal computers in over 150 countries.5 WannaCry ransomware 
held computers hostage until the ransom, which was paid in the cybercurrency 
“bitcoin,” was proffered. If the ransom was not paid, all of the files on the 
computer would be destroyed. 6  The use of this type of state-sponsored 
cyberattack, the sole purpose of which was to extort money, was unprece-
dented, at least in the domain of cyberspace.7 
However, state backing of robbers on the high seas has a long and storied 
history stretching back for thousands of years to the Ancient Greeks. 8 
 
 1 War in the Fifth Domain, THE ECONOMIST (July 1, 2010), http://www.econo-
mist.com/node/16478792. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Mathew C. Waxman, Cyber Attacks as “Force”“ Under UN Charter Article 2(4)”, 
87 INT’L L. STUDIES 43, 45 (2011). 
 4 Eric J. Rightmier, The Effect of State-Sponsored Attacks on the Private Sector, PRO-
QUEST LLC (April 2017), https://search.proquest.com/openview/9554a2b3a5afb733e 
07914a233c7d30e/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y. 
 5 Charles Riley & Samuel Burke, Intelligence Agencies Link WannaCry Cyberattack to 
North Korea, CNN BUS. (June 16, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/06/16/technol-
ogy/wannacry-north-korea-intelligence-link/index.html. 
 6 What Is WannaCry Ransomware?, FOX NEWS (May 23, 2017), http://www.foxnews 
.com/tech/2017/05/15/what-is-wannacry-ransomware.html. 
 7 Reuters, Cybersecurity Experts Fear Continued Spread of ‘Unprecedented’ Ran-
somware Attack, FORTUNE TECH (May 14, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/05/14/ransom-
ware-wanna-cry-wannacry-cyber-attack-nhs/. 
 8 Daud Hassan & Sayed M. Hasan, Origion, Development and Evolution of Maritime 
Piracy: A Historical Analysis, 49 INT’L J. L., CRIME AND JUST. 1, 2 (Jan. 12, 2017), 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1756061616300878?via%3Dihub. 
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Throughout this time, nations have alternatively “treated pirates as combat-
ants, enemies or criminals.”9 Currently, there is no uniform definition of pi-
racy at the domestic level, and there are debates regarding the efficacy of the 
international definition provided in Article 15 of the 1958 Geneva Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (HSC)
 
and Article 101 of the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).10 Nevertheless, it is the position of 
this Note that the newer form of economic aggression displayed in the 
WannaCry attack is not a new concept, and state-sponsored ransomware can 
be understood in the context of maritime piracy. 
The objectives of this Note are to provide a brief review of the evolution 
of maritime piracy and legal approaches to it, and to analyze the new state-
sponsored economic cyberattacks through the lens of this longstanding inter-
national crime. State-sponsored ransomware attacks are cyberattacks which 
are either funded by a government or executed by its agencies primarily for 
the purpose of monetary gain. These attacks are a new concept, but the under-
lying action is an old one. These ransomware attacks are just state-sponsored 
piracy in a new domain. As such, it is logical to conceptualize ransomware 
attacks under the preexisting legal framework for maritime piracy. 
II.  BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
In order to conceptualize state-sponsored cyberattacks under the history 
and laws surrounding maritime piracy, we must first possess a basic under-
standing of the subjects involved. Cyberspace is new to the technological age, 
and the laws governing this new domain remain largely unrefined. Similarly, 
the current domestic laws and international treaties governing piracy, which 
have only been in place for about the last century, are in many ways funda-
mentally different from the legal philosophies on piracy that predominated 
most of modern history. The effect of these contemporary changes underpins 
the analysis of this Note. 
 
A. Background on State-Sponsored Economic Cyberattacks 
 
State-sponsored cyberattacks differ from those perpetrated purely by indi-
viduals in a number of key aspects beyond the mere fact that a country rather 
than an individual is behind the assault. These differences can make state-
sponsored attacks both more damaging and harder to defend against.11 Unlike 
 
 9 Id. at 8. 
 10 Id. at 4.   
 11 Maria Korolov, 10 Deadliest Differences of State-Sponsored Attacks, CSO ONLINE 
(Dec. 1, 2014), https://www.csoonline.com/article/2852855/advanced-persistent-threats/ 
10-deadliest-differences-of-state-sponsored-attacks.html. 
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cybercriminals, countries will not necessarily target marketable cyber mate-
rial. Instead, they will usually attempt to gain information that will benefit the 
national interest in some manner. Perhaps the most immediately obvious ex-
ample of the type of data a government will attempt to gain is political infor-
mation stored in embassies or governmental agencies that may be important 
for national security reasons. However, states may also target private compa-
nies to access trade secrets in a bid to help their domestic producers, as was 
the case in the Chinese UglyGorilla attacks on five U.S. companies, including 
the United States Steel Corporation, in 2014.12 
State-sponsored attackers are also more likely to have large, well-orga-
nized teams, and these teams are capable of working around the clock.13 Not 
only can states perpetuate attacks all day and night, but they are also capable 
of maintaining penetration into foreign systems—undetected—for long peri-
ods of time.14 As of 2014 “84 percent of the reported attack discoveries were 
made by third parties.”15 In contrast, private hackers do not typically have the 
resources or the inclination to target more secure networks or to continue a 
hack long-term.16 
Article 2(4) of the United Nations (UN) Charter states “All Members shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”17 This prohi-
bition on the threat or use of force is a succinct provision, but its impact on 
state responses towards disfavored actions of other nations is far-reaching. 
Generally, this article restricts military attacks unless a state is acting in self-
defense or with authorization from the UN Security Council.18 In contrast, the 
self-defense exception is typically not permitted for economic and diplomatic 
assaults or pressure.19 In other words, a state cannot respond with physical 
force when the assault itself was not physical. This proposition usually holds 
true even if the targeted state suffers tremendous costs.20 
With regard to cyberwarfare, Article 2(4) has been interpreted to prohibit 
cyberattacks that cause physical consequences if the effects reach a certain 
severity threshold, but the same is not true of cyberattacks aimed at causing 
 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
 18 Ido Kilovaty, Rethinking the Prohibition on the Use of Force in the Light of Economic 
Cyber Warfare: Towards a Broader Scope of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, 4 J. L. & 
CYBER WARFARE 210 (2015). 
 19 Waxman, supra note 3. 
 20 Id. 
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economic harm.21 The current use of force scholarship commonly understands 
this distinction as one between “kinetic” cyberattacks (KCAs), which produce 
“direct or indirect physical consequences,”22 and non-kinetic cyberattacks, 
which produce only non-physical harm. 
For example, a Twitter hack in 2013 announcing an explosion in the White 
House and the death of President Obama caused the Dow Jones index to plum-
met 145 points, costing approximately $150 billion. This incident would not 
have fallen under the Article 2(4) prohibition because it was not a KCA.23 On 
the other hand, in 1982, hackers tampered with software that controlled the 
pump speeds and valve settings of a Soviet pipeline, leading to a massive ex-
plosion,24 which would be considered a kinetic cyberattack, and thus would 
be encompassed by Article 2(4). 
The 2017 WannaCry attack targeted preexisting programming weaknesses 
in computers running on Microsoft operating systems across dozens of coun-
tries.25 The ransomware was capable of infecting both home computers and 
the networks of larger organizations, leading to the loss of sensitive infor-
mation, financial losses, disruption to regular operations, and harm to some 
organizations’ reputations.26 The attack was unprecedented in scope, but de-
spite the fact that it was a state-sponsored effort to steal from individuals and 
private entities in cyberspace,27 it was not a KCA as most scholarship under-
stands it. WannaCry was economically motivated aggression and as such 
would almost certainly not be actionable under Article 2(4) as it is presently 
interpreted. However, WannaCry highly resembles our historical understand-
ing of maritime piracy and privateering in many significant ways. 
 
B. The History of Maritime Piracy 
 
While many pirates during the “Golden Age” of maritime piracy were true 
outlaws, there existed a large system of state-sponsored piracy.28 From Queen 
Elizabeth I’s Sir Francis Drake, often referred to by the Queen as “my pirate,” 
to the Barbarossa Brothers, who were sponsored by the Ottoman Sultan, loot-
ing enemy ships was a common practice from the 1400s through the late 
 
 21 Kilovaty, supra note 18, at 213. 
 22 Id. at 212. 
 23 Id. at 211. 
 24 THE ECONOMIST, supra note 1. 
 25 Supreet Kaur Sahi, A Study of WannaCry Ransomware Attack, 4 IJERCSE 5 (2017), 
https://technoarete.org/common_abstract/pdf/IJERCSE/v4/i9/Ext_89621.pdf. 
 26 Id. at 6. 
 27 Reuters, supra note 7; see also Kilovaty, supra note 18, at 212-13. 
 28 Jesse Greenspan, 8 Real-Life Pirates Who Roved the High Seas, A&E TELEVISION 
NETWORKS (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.history.com/news/8-real-life-pirates-who-roved-
the-high-seas. 
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1700s.29 On the other hand, laws from around the same time period often re-
quired pirates to be tried and executed aboard the capturing warship.30 The 
scourge of the pirate, whether under the protection of a flag or otherwise, has 
plagued sovereign nations for nearly as long as merchants have been sailing 
the high seas, and while it has been eradicated in some areas for a time, it has 
never been fully eliminated.31 
As most Romans and Greeks understood, pirates were considered “bellig-
erent[s].”32 This was in the context of war, and sailors looting ships were 
largely considered to be acting as enemy combatants.33 The Ancient Queen 
Teuta of Illyria “authorized her subjects’ ships to ‘plunder all whom they fell 
in with.’ . . . This eventually led to uncontrolled piracy in the Adriatic.”34 In 
time, Queen Teuta’s sanctioning of her subjects’ plundering caused a war be-
tween Illyria and Rome.35 On the other hand, not all sovereigns condoned pi-
racy by their citizens. King Minos of Crete “is credited as the first [ruler] to 
establish a strong naval fleet to [suppress] piracy.”36 A clear pattern emerged 
in ancient times: Piracy flourished when governmental regimes were weak, 
and it retreated in the face of strong sovereigns.37 
In more recent history, we have the example of piracy on the Barbary Coast 
between the 16th and 18th centuries. Piracy grew most powerful under the 
protection of the Ottoman Empire.38 In response to the Barbary pirates, Euro-
pean nations signed treaties with the Barbary regencies requiring the Europe-
ans to pay tribute for safe passage through the seas.39 While this was primarily 
an economic venture for the Barbary sovereigns, the Europeans may have felt 
more compelled to comply with the tribute demands due to the millions of 
European mariners who were captured and forced into slavery by the pirates.40 
This level of coercion is not present in the current-day ransomware attacks, 
though the idea of paying tribute to a state for safety in a domain is similar. 
Around the same time period that the piracy in the Barbary Coast was run-
ning rampant, Spain and Portugal signed the papal Treaty of Tordesillas, 
 
 29 Id. 
 30 Douglas Guilfoyle & Tiffany Willey Middleton, Law, Pirates, and Piracy, AMERICAN 
BAR ASS’N (2010), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/public_educa-
tion/latl-pirates.pdf. 
 31 Hassan & Hasan, supra note 8, at 2. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 5. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at 6. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
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which ultimately prohibited many other seafaring European nations from sta-
tioning their ships in the Caribbean or Indian Oceans.41 As a result, France, 
Denmark, and England sanctioned privateering in order to weaken the Spanish 
and Portuguese who were rapidly becoming rich from trade in those regions.42 
This time period later became known as the “Golden Age” of piracy.43 
The common thread through these examples of state-endorsed piracy is 
that all instances could be regarded as a type of economic warfare. The spon-
soring state aimed the pirates at its enemies or rivals, simultaneously weaken-
ing its opponents and gaining an economic advantage, all without any formal 
wars. However, this brief history has also demonstrated that tolerance for or 
encouragement of piracy only leads to its growth, which makes it difficult to 
eradicate in the long run.44 
The Barbary pirates were not eliminated until the 1800s, after the United 
States waged two wars against them and France conquered Algiers.45 Simi-
larly, the piracy that American colonial governors endorsed, which came 
about due to the costly regulations Great Britain imposed on the colonies, only 
ceased when England and the colonies passed laws calling for the death pen-
alty for pirates and their aides.46 Even still, it took well over twenty years for 
the Golden Age to decline.47 
 
C. Contemporary Understanding of Laws on Maritime Piracy 
 
During the first half of the 20th century, the prevailing belief was that mar-
itime piracy had largely disappeared.48 For this reason, “initial attempts in the 
twentieth century to introduce a treaty regime against piracy [were] unsuc-
cessful.”49 Instead, we now have an array of domestic laws coexisting with 
international treaties regarding piracy.50 “Under international law, piracy is 
[recognized] as a domestic crime of universal jurisdiction . . . .”51 With regard 
to piracy, “[u]niversal jurisdiction is an older concept having little connection 
 
 41 Id. at 7. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Greenspan, supra note 28. 
 44 Hassan & Hasan, supra note 8, at 8-9. 
 45 Id. at 7. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Lawrence Azubuike, International Law Regime Against Piracy, 15 ANN. SURV. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 43, 44 (2009). 
 49 Id. 
 50 Lucas Bento, Toward an International Law of Piracy Sui Generis: How the Dual Na-
ture of Maritime Piracy Law Enables Piracy to Flourish, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 399, 455 
(2011). 
 51 Hassan & Hasan, supra note 8, at 2. 
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with ‘modern’ universal jurisdiction,” which allows any apprehending state to 
prosecute certain crimes that shock the conscience of humanity, such as gen-
ocide and war crimes.52 The older conception allowed any state to take law 
enforcement action on the high seas against any vessel suspected of piracy, 
even vessels flagged to foreign states.53 As such, all sovereign countries could 
exercise jurisdiction over piracy, but they had to do so only through their re-
spective domestic criminal justice systems.54 
Among the most contested issues under this regime is the actual definition 
of the term “piracy” itself.55 In United States v. Smith56 and United States v. 
Brig Malek Adhel,57 two landmark Supreme Court cases heard in the mid-
1800s, the United States defined piracy as “robbery, or forcible depredation, 
upon the sea.”58 But U.S. statutes from the same time period added a stipula-
tion to this definition: piracy should be defined by the  “law of nations,” which 
would include treaties regarding piracy.59 While the Supreme Court in the 
1800s was creating a definition meant to be interpreted as adhering to the law 
of nations, we have since created new treaties that alter that definition. Similar 
provisions are seen in the domestic laws of England and Australia, though 
other countries define piracy without reference to the law of nations.60 For 
example, the domestic law of the Philippines requires “the act . . . take place 
in the state’s territorial waters to constitute piracy.”61 
The language “law of nations” is present in the United States Constitution, 
and was invoked in relation to piracy long before any multilateral treaty in-
volving the crime ever came into being.62 Nevertheless, the international com-
munity attempted to create a more uniform approach to maritime piracy with 
the enactment of two treaties in the mid-twentieth century, of which the 
United States is party only to the Geneva Convention.63 Both Article 15 of the 
1958 Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea (HSC)
 
and Article 101 of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) define piracy 
as:  
 
 52 Guilfoyle & Middleton, supra note 30, at 293. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Azubuike, supra note 48, at 46. 
   56 United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 154 (1820).  
   57 Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. 210, 232 (1844).  
 58 Hassan & Hasan, supra note 8, at 3. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 4. 
 62 Id. at 3. 
 63 Guilfoyle & Middleton, supra note 30. 
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(a)  any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of dep-
redation, committed for  private ends by the crew or the pas-
sengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and  directed: 
 (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or 
against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; 
 (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place 
outside the jurisdiction  of any State; 
(b)  any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship 
or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship 
or aircraft; 
 (c)   any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act  
 described in subparagraph (a) or (b).64 
 
Key for this Note’s analysis is the fact that the action must be committed 
for private ends. This distinguishes piracy from the ransomware attacks per-
petrated by North Korea, due to their sovereign purpose. WannaCry was more 
akin to the notion of privateering in the Golden Age of Euro-American piracy 
in that WannaCry was essentially state actors working against private individ-
uals in an “international” domain. As such, while pirates and privateers were 
distinguished only by the fact that states sponsored the latter,65 the distinction 
is still important when analyzing the contemporary legal framework. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
State-sponsored cyberattacks conceptually align with the historical under-
standing of maritime piracy. The pirates during the Golden Age of piracy 
could be viewed as the equivalent of modern-day private military contrac-
tors.66 However, military contractor activity typically tends to focus less on 
material theft and more on strategic military advancement. The state-spon-
sored pirates that existed before the 1900s, while endorsed by monarchs, were 
primarily attempting to enrich themselves and their sponsor. Similarly, the 
goal of the WannaCry ransomware attack was to enrich North Korea. 
 
 64 Hassan & Hasan, supra note 8, at 4. 
 65 Id. at 2. 
 66 Guilfoyle & Middleton, supra note 30. 
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A common theme between these cyberattacks and historical state-spon-
sored piracy is the indiscriminate nature of the taking. 67  North Korea’s 
WannaCry ransomware attack did not just target other state actors. It also hit 
private companies and individuals in over 150 separate countries.68 While on 
a national scale India was one of the hardest hit countries, companies like 
FedEx, Nissan, and railway companies in Germany and Russia, as well as at 
least sixteen NHS organizations in the United Kingdom, were badly af-
fected.69 Additionally, a large number of Chinese colleges and students were 
struck in the attack.70 This single state-sponsored malware attack hit govern-
mental entities, private companies, and individual people, and was motivated 
by economic gain. 
Another similarity between cyberattacks and historical maritime piracy is 
the relatively low costs needed to perpetuate assault. The probability of a pi-
rate being tried and successfully prosecuted was low, in part due to the “elu-
siveness and anonymity of a ship in the expanse of [the ocean].”71 The same 
difficulties are presented by cybercrime. Attacks in cyberspace are hard to 
track, and even if the guilty party is identified, numerous jurisdictional issues 
must be addressed before a trial can occur.72 
Prior to the treaties on piracy that were drafted in the 1900s, there were 
several approaches to handling piracy. Alfred H. Rubin and others argue that 
piratical actions by states were merely the states exercising a right to seize 
passing ships in order to levy taxes against them.73 The pitfall of this “tax” 
justification is that piracy was a violent seizure of merchandise from non-cit-
izens, leaving the question of whether these countries had jurisdiction to act.74 
However, playing into this understanding of the role of piracy was the idea 
of negotiating tributes for safe passage, as was seen along the Barbary Coast.75 
In a way, payment after a ransomware attack is like paying tribute. However, 
in order to use tributes as a preventative measure, the attacking sovereign 
would need to openly own its involvement in the economic assault. As would 
be expected, North Korea continues to deny any involvement in the 
 
 67 J. L. Anderson, Piracy and World History: An Economic Perspective on Maritime 
Predation, 6 J. WORLD HIST. 175, 176 (1995).  
 68 Riley & Burke, supra note 5. 
 69 Savita Mohurle & Manisha Patil, A Brief Study of Wannacry Threat: Ransomware 
Attack 2017, 8 INT’L J. ADVANCED RES. COMPUTER SCI. 1938, 1939 (2017).  
 70 Id. at 178. 
 71 Anderson, supra note 67, at 178. 
 72 Deb Shinder, What Makes Cybercrime Laws so Difficult to Enforce, CBS TECHRE-
PUBLIC (Jan. 26, 2011), https://www.techrepublic.com/blog/it-security/what-makes-cyber-
crime-laws-so-difficult-to-enforce/. 
 73 Anderson, supra note 67, at 177. 
 74 Id. at 178. 
 75 Hassan & Hasan, supra note 8, at 6. 
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WannaCry cyberattack, calling accusations by the British government “‘a 
wicked attempt’ to tighten international sanctions on the country.”76 And it 
seems unlikely that other countries would be any more willing to openly admit 
to such antagonistic behavior. 
Additionally, one of the primary historical problems with paying tributes 
and accepting a semi-regime of piracy is that maritime predation tends to es-
cape the control of the sponsoring nation. For example, the promotion of pi-
racy by the ancient Illyrian Queen Teuta, who “[authorized] her subjects’ 
ships to ‘plunder all whom they fell in with,’” eventually led to “uncontrolled 
piracy” in the Adriatic.77 These concerns are precisely the reason why the U.S. 
government has a general policy against negotiating with kidnappers.78 Logi-
cally, conceding to pay incentivizes the enemy to continue extorting ransoms 
from the United States. Therefore, sacrificing a few people in the short term 
may better serve the state in the long run. 
Historically, states are more successful in driving out piracy when they 
take a strong stance against the activity, state-sponsored or private. King Mi-
nos of Crete is credited as the first ruler to establish a strong naval fleet with 
the goal of stopping maritime piracy, and he was successful at suppressing 
it.79 In 1698, England passed the Piracy Act, which imposed the death penalty 
for the crime of piracy.80 “Between 1716 and 1726, a large number of pirates 
were executed in public under the new legislation,” and approximately 100 
years later, the United States fought in the Barbary Wars to end piracy in the 
Barbary Coast.81 At some periods in history, justice against pirates was so 
swift and decisive that those found to be pirates could be tried and executed 
aboard the capturing warship.82 
When the pirates were tried and executed aboard the capturing warship, 
the punishing nation was exercising jurisdiction in the high seas. Analogous 
to this situation in the high seas is the internet, which could be conceptualized 
as international waters. If countries could track attackers back to their home 
IP addresses, they could immediately launch a counterattack. Because the 
counterattack would not necessarily ever exit cyberspace, whether the retali-
ating country would have the jurisdiction to mete out a punishment against 
their attacker on the spot is debatable. 
 
 76 North Korea Calls UK WannaCry Accusations ‘Wicked’, BBC NEWS (Oct. 31, 2017), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41816958. 
 77 Hassan & Hasan, supra note 8, at 5. 
 78 Adam Taylor, The Logic of Not Paying Ransoms, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/08/21/the-logic-of-not-pay-
ing-ransoms/?utm_term=.4a9021105f47. 
 79 Hassan & Hasan, supra note 8, at 5. 
 80 Id. at 7. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Guilfoyle & Middleton, supra note 30, at 292. 
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If nations approached state-sponsored ransomware attacks in such a direct 
fashion, determining which level of force the UN Charter Article 2(4) Use of 
Force provision would allow in such cases would be difficult. When retaliat-
ing against another country, state actions move beyond the punishment of 
criminals and into more strategic waters: “[T]here is no clear consensus on 
how [a retaliating country] could legally respond, whether with armed force, 
its own cyber attack, or some other measure.”83 But, the history of maritime 
piracy seems to suggest countries should strike back with a cyberattack that 
cripples the original assaulter’s ability to continue its cyber-predation or risk 
the expansion of economic cyberpiracy. 
Looking at the issue through a more modern piracy lens, analyzing re-
sponses to ransomware attacks under the current definition of maritime piracy, 
as found in HSC Article 15 and UNCLOS Article 101, is difficult because the 
act must be committed for private ends to constitute piracy.84 Ransomware 
attacks like WannaCry do meet the definitional deprivation requirement, but 
state-sponsored ransomware attacks are by their nature not meant for private 
ends, as they are acts perpetuated by the government for a public purpose. 
However, subpart (c) of the definition of piracy includes “any act of inciting 
or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).”85 
Therefore, if a state were to direct and pay a private entity to carry out a ran-
somware attack, the attack could potentially still fall within this definition.   
If that premise is accepted, then the retaliating state would have the au-
thority under UNCLOS to seize the property or information stored on the at-
tacker’s computer, which is analogous to the pirate’s ship.86  This seizure 
would take place remotely, so the chances of actually apprehending the hacker 
behind the attack would be slim. However, it would authorize a retaliating 
country to have a defense that is both legally viable and an adequate threat, as 
countries like North Korea may be less likely to attempt ransomware hacks if 
they know it could be legal for another country to steal their information in 
return. 
If that premise is not accepted, the analysis would turn on the UN’s Article 
2(4) provision on the use of force, which as discussed in the Introduction, has 
several significant flaws when it comes to purely economic cyberattacks. Pri-
marily, this article restricts military attacks unless a nation is acting in self-
 
 83 Scott Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in In-
ternational Law, 25 BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 191 (2009). 
 84 See Hassan & Hasan, supra note 8, at 4. 
 85 Id. 
 86 See Legal Framework for the Repression of Piracy Under UNCLOS, U.N. DIV. FOR 
OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.un.org/depts/los/pi-
racy/piracy_legal_framework.htm. 
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defense or with authorization from the UN Security Council.87 The self-de-
fense exception is typically not permitted for economic and diplomatic as-
saults or pressure.88 As such, a state generally cannot respond with physical 
force when the assault itself was not physical, even if the targeted state suffers 
tremendous costs.89 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The newer form of economic aggression displayed in the WannaCry attack 
is not a new concept, and state-sponsored ransomware can be understood in 
the context of maritime piracy. Prior to the 1900s, nations frequently allowed 
maritime piracy to flourish and often even sponsored the predatory practice. 
The history of these regimes demonstrates that society as a whole is better off 
if states take a hard stance against maritime piracy. In many ways, ransom-
ware attacks are to the internet what pirates traditionally were to the seas, so 
countries would be best served by striking back against these types of eco-
nomic cyberattacks unequivocally. 
However, modern treaties regarding maritime piracy restrict the definition 
of piracy to private actions for the benefit of private parties.90 Therefore, mod-
eling the approach to cyber threats (and any potential treaties within that 
realm) off of the current piracy treaties should be done with a critical eye to-
wards the potential shortcomings of these treaties as applied in the cyber 
realm. For example, the provision requiring that the illegal acts be committed 
for private ends does not translate as well to the cyber realm as it does to the 
physical seas. If state troops board an American vessel, even if the state’s pur-
pose in authorizing the boarding is purely mercenary, the boarding is still an 
act of physical aggression that easily falls within the provisions of other rele-
vant treaties, such as UN Article 2(4). But if the allegorical equivalent occurs 
in cyberspace, there is no physical violence to accompany the state-sponsored 
thievery, forcing states to work around the language in current treaties in order 
to find a legal retaliation. 
The world as a whole has an abundance of experience dealing with mari-
time piracy. The understanding that thousands of years of marine pillaging 
has given us, both in the form of our more traditional understandings and in 
the form of our modern-day approach, should guide us as we begin tackling 
the domain of cyberspace, and more specifically, state-sponsored cyberattacks 
against private parties.   
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